In , i estimated a model of interest rate determination suggesting that interstate banking will, ceteris pa:ibus, decrease competition in the n~ongage market if it lowers the number of competing firms and increases deposit concentration levels. I identified statistically significant relations between mortgage rates and the n u m~r of firms, concentration ratios, a unit banking dummy, and the number of commet~c:al bank offices divided by the n~ambers of savings banks and savings and loan assc~.~a-tions. Timothy Curry and John Rose argue that despite these"impressive" results, my empirical work involving the use of concentration ratios is flawed in two respect:~. In this Reply, ! argue that Curry and Rose suffer from the same "flaw" in one case a~ld introduce an arbitrary assumption in the other case.
In , i estimated a model of interest rate determination suggesting that interstate banking will, ceteris pa:ibus, decrease competition in the n~ongage market if it lowers the number of competing firms and increases deposit concentration levels. I identified statistically significant relations between mortgage rates and the n u m~r of firms, concentration ratios, a unit banking dummy, and the number of commet~c:al bank offices divided by the n~ambers of savings banks and savings and loan assc~.~a-tions. Timothy Curry and John Rose argue that despite these"impressive" results, my empirical work involving the use of concentration ratios is flawed in two respect:~. In this Reply, ! argue that Curry and Rose suffer from the same "flaw" in one case a~ld introduce an arbitrary assumption in the other case.
Curry and Rose argue that it is incorrect not to consolidate bank subsidiaries of multibank holding companies (MBHC) when computing bank content, ation data. Tire issue is whether or not MBHCs operate as integrated, single entities similar to branches of banks. Curry and Rose argue m the affirmative, based on survey evidence in ; Golembe (1978); and Whalen (1981) .
Two points are in order. First, Rose (1978, p. 71) mentions that " . . . studies of the cperating policies of parent companies typically involve ad hoc survey work, the results of which often do not lend themselves ~o statistical analysis." Nonetheless, he argues that survey analysis suggests that MBHCs have witnessed an increasing degree of centralization over time. Second, there exist empirical studies on the issue that are not mentioned in Curry and Rose. t The studies of Ware (1975); ; ; Goldberg (1976); ; Whitehead a~d King (1976); find no evidence that MBHCs h lye exerted systematic effects on market competition. Evidehce of minor effects on competition, via small scale entry, is foun¢l in and . It should be noted that small scale entry will not typically alter three-firm concentration ratios, l~trge scale entry effects on competition are found in Heggestad and Rhoades (1976B) .
Which type of evidence are we to believe? The survey evidence ~uggests that we should consolidate and the empirical evidence suggests the opposite. While I prefer empirical over survey evidence, the issue remains unsettled. However, note that ~he reestimation of my model in Curry and Rose sheds some light on this point. ReestinaFor an e;~cellent sumr.~ary of empirical studies, see , I estimated a model of interest rate determination suggesting that interstate banking will, ceteris padbus, decrease competition in the mongage market if it lowers the number of comp:ting firms and increases deposit conc,:ntration levels. I identified statistically significant relations between mortgage rates and the number of firms, concentration ratios, a unit banking dummy, and the number of commet'c:al bank offices divided by the nr1mbers of savings banks and savings and loan assoc.a dons. Timothy Curry and John Rose argue that despite these' 'impressive" results. my empirical work involving the lise of concentration ratios is flawed in two respect'). In this Reply, I argue that Curry and Rose suffer from the same "flaw" in one case akld introduce an arbitrary assumption in the other case.
Curry and Rose argue that it is incorrect not to consolidate bank subsidiaries of multibank holding companies (MBHC) when computing bank cOllcent.ation data. The issue is whether or not MBHCs operate as integnted, single entities similar to branches of banks. Curry and Rose argue In the affirmative, based on survey evidence in ; Golembe (1978); and Whalen (1981) .
Two points are in order. First, Rose (1978, p. 71) mentions that ., ... studies of the operating policies of parent companies typically involve ad hoc survey work, the results of which often do not lend themselve~ m statistkal analysis... Nonetheless, he argues that survey analysis suggests that MBHCs have witnessed an increasing degree of centralization over time. Second, there exist empirical studies on the issue that are not mentioned in Curry and Rose.! The studies of Ware (1975); ; ; Goldberg (1976); ; Whitehead and King (1976); find no evidence that MBHCs hIve exerted systematic effects on market compe tition. Evidel.c~ of minor effects on competition, via small scale entry, is founC! in and . It should be noted that small scale entry will not typically alter three-firm concentration ratios. Large scale entry effects on competition are found in Heggestad and Rhoades (19768) .
Which type of evidence are we to believe? The survey evidence 'tuggests that we should consolidate and the empirical evidence suggests the opposite. While I prp, fer empirical over survey evidence, the issue remains unsettled. However, note that the reestimation of my model in Curry and Rose sheds some light on this point. Reestirla-tion using consolidated data (in place of my unconsolidated data) shows ihat both the coefficiem and significance level of the concentration variable decline. For example, the t-statistic for concentration meas+Jred in terms of all firms falls from 2.'86 [Eqt+ation (3)] to 1.95 [Equation (5)]. As sugge gted in Curry a~d Rose, the assumption of centralized decision making may be wrong. This result is consistent with the above-mentioned empirical :gtudies suggesting that the MBHC movement has exerted little, if any, effect on market competition. In other wo~'ds, Curry and Rose support the use of unconsolidated concentration data in market structure-performance studies.
Curry and Rose also argue that I err in measuring firm concentration in terms of commercial banks alone and that their measure, which includes thrifts, is superior. Wh:,le theiir measure is an interesting avenue to explore, its significance is dubious. Clearly, both of our measures suffer from the same problem; concentration in the mortgage market should control for relative market participation by all lenders. That is, a ~t t e r measure would weigh the dominance of leading firms by their relative mortgage ~:ommitment activity in the SMSA. Since neither of our measures control for this problem, both of our studies are subject to the same error.
